Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

双选信道下一种基于混沌交织的FBMC系统

高速移动环境下，无线信道具有时频双选性衰落的特性，使得滤波器组多载波(Filter Bank Multi-carrier，FBMC)系统产生长突发差错。将一种基于Baker映射的混沌交织算法应用在滤波器组多载波系统中，根据混沌密钥对发送数据进行分块和重新排列，按照Baker映射规则完成数据交织。此方法可以将长突发差错变为单突发差错，结合卷积编码能有效地纠正双选信道产生的长突发差错。仿真结果表明，在双选择信道中，基于混沌交织的滤波器组多载波系统误比特率性能优于传统基于块交织的滤波器组多载波系统。     

Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Understanding expert practices in order to control expert activities: The case of trading

Experts are important actors of organizational control. Nevertheless, experience suggests that they must be controlled as well. This is particularly the case for traders in financial institutions. We first identify the limits of traditional control patterns when the managing the activities of experts is at stake. Hyperspecialization, which is the ability to act within different logics and multiple time horizons, suggests that multidimensional representations of these activities be adopted and made explicit, which has the potential to prevent such activities from turning problematic. By examining bank risks and conducting additional interviews with actors from bank trading services, we recommend that multiple components of complexity be preserved when dealing with expert‐related operational risks, instead of reducing this complexity to a single concept. Such an approach implies to turn back expertise against itself. Copyright © 2017 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The funding of subsidiaries equity,double leverage and the risk of bank holding companies

Banking groups exploit double leverage when ‘debt is issued by the parent company and the proceeds are invested in subsidiaries as equity’. Financial authorities have frequently raised concerns about the issue of double leverage because this type of intra‐firm financing appears to allow for both the arbitrage of capital and the assumption of risk. This article focuses on the relationship between double leverage and risk‐taking within banking groups. First, we discuss this relationship based on an examination of balance sheet figures. Second, we analyze a large sample of United States Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) from 1990–2014. The results show that BHCs are more prone to risk when they increase their double leverage, namely, when the stake of the parent within subsidiaries is larger than the stand‐alone capital of the parent. This paper's primary implication for policymakers is that the regulators of complex financial entities should more efficiently address the issue of double leverage, thereby limiting the potential negative consequences that arise from corporate instability.     

金融压力、所有制结构与银行风险承担——基于中国影子银行活动的实证研究*

2008年金融危机之后，监测与防范系统性金融风险、维护金融稳定成为各国监管机构的工作重点。本文构建了一个反映我国系统性金融风险的中国金融压力指数（FSIC）。基于此，本文研究不同所有制结构的商业银行将如何调整影子银行业务以应对系统性金融风险。实证结果表明，当金融压力上升时，相较于国有银行，非国有银行的风险承担水平显著上升。进一步研究发现，这一差异与两类银行对影子银行这一风险业务的调整有关。当金融压力上升时，国有银行会显著减少影子银行业务，而非国有银行的影子银行业务不会减少。本文提出了国有银行的双重职能这一观点来解释实证研究的发现。本文的研究结论对于指导我国金融市场化改革和防范系统性金融风险具有重要启示。     

制度变迁下国有商业银行农村服务网络演化——以农业银行兰考县支行为例

经济转轨背景下农村的银行服务网络呈现出不同于城市的演化特征。从制度变迁角度建构分析框架,基于历史、调查与访谈数据,以农业银行兰考县支行为例,探讨我国商业银行农村服务网络演化动力机制。研究表明:国有商业银行农村服务网络经历了恢复成立后的快速扩张和密集的人工网点服务,市场化改革中农村业务收缩和大规模网点撤并,到新时期人工、自助、电子、代理等多元服务渠道扩张;农村银行服务网络演化是商业银行和制度环境相互作用的空间过程,普惠金融战略下我国特别强调金融服务的均等化和基础金融网点的全覆盖,商业银行不断借助新的伙伴关系开拓农村市场,其中合作代理日益发挥重要作用。不同地区、不同商业银行农村服务网络模式的差异,农村银行服务网络转型对农村社会经济发展、金融生态环境改善、农民金融素养提升的影响等还需进一步研究。     

Anticipating independence,no premonition of partition. The lessons of bank branch expansion on the Indian subcontinent, 1939 to 1946

We examine investment in bank branches on the Indian subcontinent in 1939 and 1946. In 1947, the states of India and Pakistan were created from the erstwhile colony of British India. Partition was destabilizing to both economies. We use branch expansion as a proxy for entrepreneur's pre‐partition predictions of the future of these regions. Our results indicate there were no premonitions of economic dislocation. Banks tended to deepen their presence in regions which were already developed. But controlling for the level of 1931 development, branch placement was highest in exactly those regions, Bengal and the Punjab, which were to experience the greatest negative consequences from political division. After 1947, multiple banks failed; most failing banks were registered in the Punjab or Bengal region. In United India, businessmen saw as much promise in regions which were to become Pakistan as in regions which were to become India. After partition, the Pakistan regions were immediately more economically fragile. This event provides a general lesson. Economic integration had intensified over the years of British rule. The abrupt stop to integration harmed especially the smaller, less diversified region. Politicians should be wary of politically dividing regions which have evolved to function as integrated economic units.     

Board diversity reforms: Do they matter for EU bank performance?

We examine the impact of governance reforms related to board diversity on the performance of European Union banks. Using a difference‐in‐difference approach, we document that reforms increase bank stock returns and their volatility within the first 3 years after their enactment. The type of reform matters, with quotas increasing return volatility. The effectiveness of reforms depends on a country's institutional environment. The impact of reforms on return volatility is found to be beneficial in countries more open to diversity, with common law system and with greater economic freedom. Finally, reforms play a bigger role in banks that have ex ante less heterogeneous boards.